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Barriers to Effective Risk Management 
Michelle M. Harner∗ 
ABSTRACT 
“[A]s long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  
We’re still dancing.”
**
 
 
This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former 
Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality 
and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America.  
These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and 
some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial 
sector.  They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural 
norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make 
implementing a meaningful risk culture and mitigating the impact of 
future economic downturns a challenging proposition. 
The global recession highlighted significant failures in firms’ 
risk-management practices.  These failures implicated weaknesses not 
only in firms’ financial risk modeling, but also the human or gover-
nance side of risk management.  Unfortunately, fixing the former 
might be significantly easier than attending to the latter.  Studies 
suggest that cognitive biases, including confirmation bias, overconfi-
dence or optimism bias, and framing, can impair a board’s and man-
agement’s ability to assess risk accurately.  These problems are com-
pounded by the typical incentive structure and the “winner-take-all” 
mentality adopted by many corporations in the United States. 
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tance of Lauren Genvert and Alice Johnson.  Nevertheless, all opinions, errors, and 
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 ** Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Out, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_ 
id=fto070920071725183786. 
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This Article analyzes the potential benefits of improved risk-
management practices, commonly called enterprise risk management 
(ERM), and the potential barriers to implementing meaningful ERM 
at U.S. firms.  ERM is an integrated risk-management framework that 
seeks to improve knowledge of and communication about potential 
risks throughout the firm, starting with the board and senior man-
agement team.  Indeed, the board and senior management team are 
vital to creating a risk culture.  This Article considers the impact of 
boardroom dynamics and U.S. corporate culture on risk-management 
practices.  This Article further considers whether regulation or a dif-
ferent approach is needed to encourage U.S. corporations to invest 
the necessary human capital in meaningful ERM. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Risk management is not a new concept, but it typically garners 
renewed attention during periods of corporate scandals or market 
turmoil.
1
  The global recession of 2008 (“2008 recession”) is no ex-
ception.
2
  Many commentators have highlighted significant risk-
management failures as contributing factors to that recession.
3
 
The recurring nature of the risk-management problem suggests 
that the approach to, or the implementation of, corporate risk-
management practices is lacking in some respect.  Prior studies show 
that meaningful risk-management practices can enhance firm per-
formance.
4
  Yet U.S. corporations are slow to embrace risk manage-
 
 1 For example, Barings Bank, Long-Term Capital Management, and the Asian 
Crisis each are often viewed as a case study in risk management failures.  See, e.g., 
JOHN MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USES AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (2003) 
(discussing risk management issues raised by derivatives trading and analyzing the 
Barings Bank and Long-Term Capital Management scenarios, among others); 
GEOFFREY POITRAS, RISK MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 
(2002) (same); Wing Thye Woo, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis, and the Prospects 
for Resuming High Growth, in EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
9–31 (Lok-Sanh Ho & Chi-Wa Yuen eds., 2003); Case Studies, INT’L FIN. RISK INST., 
http://riskinstitute.ch/Introduction.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (analyzing Bar-
ings Bank, Long-Term Capital Management, and the Asian Crisis in the context of 
risk management). 
 2 This Article uses the term “2008 recession” to reference the entire period of 
financial turmoil, which became widely evident in late 2007 and continued into 2009. 
 3 See, e.g., Roger Barker, Observations on the Current Crisis from a Corporate Gover-
nance Perspective, INST. DIRECTORS, Feb. 20, 2009, at 2, available at 
https://www.iod.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/article_responding_crisi
s.pdf; Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN. 
MARKET TRENDS, Feb. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/ 
1/42229620.pdf; Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at MM24, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?_r=1& 
pagewanted=print; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 
(May 15, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20080515a.htm); RISK & INS. MGMT. SOC’Y, INC., THE 2008 FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (Bill Coffin ed., 2009), 
available at http://www.RIMS.org/ERMwhitepaper [hereinafter RIMS PAPER].  For a 
summary of the role of risk management in the 2008 recession, see Michelle M. 
Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the 
Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. TECH. L. 45 (2010). 
 4 See Lori A. Brassell-Cicchinit, The Shareholder Value of Crisis Handling, RISK 
MGMT., May 2003 (explaining 1997 study showing value in risk planning and discuss-
ing case studies); Steven M. Cassidy et al., The Market Value of the Corporate Risk Man-
agement Function, 57 J. RISK & INS. 664, 668 (1990) (explaining that markets react posi-
tively to risk management); Patrick J. Stroh, Enterprise risk management at UnitedHealth 
Group, 87 STRATEGIC FIN. 26 (2005); Marcel Boyer et al., The Value of Risk Manage-
ment: A Frontier Analysis 1 (Mar. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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ment, and as evidenced by the 2008 recession, even when they do, the 
results are underwhelming.
5
 
This Article examines two possible barriers to effective risk man-
agement: individual biases and cultural norms.
6
  At its core any risk-
management technique attempts to provide corporate decision mak-
ers with better and more accurate information to identify, assess, and 
mitigate events that threaten firm value (i.e., risk events).
7
  A firm cer-
tainly can adopt strict procedures instructing managers on how and 
what types of information to evaluate, detailing the timing and partic-
ipants in risk assessment meetings and requiring periodic reports to 
the board of directors and senior executives.  Those procedures 
alone, however, will not necessarily change a firm’s decision regard-
ing any particular risk, deter corporate fraud, or help moderate mar-
ket turmoil.
8
  Individuals still make those decisions, and their possible 
biases and surrounding environment may be more influential than 
any risk assessment reports.
9
 
This reality raises an important question: Can the law change the 
way individuals receive and filter information, or is the human com-
ponent of risk management an inevitable limitation on its utility?  
The question is difficult to answer definitively, but this Article sug-
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687127 (describing a study 
showing that the “role of financial risk management is to create flexibility to alleviate 
this inefficiency problem 
 . . . [and] it does contribute indirectly to the value of the firm”); Brian W. Nocco & 
Rene M. Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice (July 2006) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=921402 (discussing value of risk management in context of competitive 
advantage and shareholder wealth). 
 5 See infra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 6 See discussion infra Part V.A (explaining that many of the biases discussed in 
the individual context apply in the group or collective board context as well); see also 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Group-
think, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the 
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83–84, 99–108 (1985) (describing bases of ingroup bias 
among directors). ’ 
 7 See infra Parts II.A, III.A. 
 8 See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward 
a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1551243 (using boardroom conference example to illustrate uncertainty 
in decision-making process and noting that, despite extensive advice provided at 
meeting, “when the time came to make the decision, the CEO had no authority upon 
which to fall back except her own”). 
 9 See infra Part V.A. 
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gests that policymakers will encourage, and corporate boards will de-
sign and implement, more effective risk-management practices if they 
acknowledge and attempt to address this limitation. 
To assist in this endeavor, this Article analyzes three of the cog-
nitive biases that may impede risk assessment—confirmation bias, 
overconfidence/optimism bias, and framing—and considers how 
other legal disciplines have addressed bias in decision making.
10
  This 
Article uses Citigroup Inc. as a case study to highlight potential beha-
vioral and cultural barriers to effective risk management.
11
  This Ar-
ticle suggests that training and outside assessment may help corpo-
rate decision makers avoid some biases in risk assessment and 
response decisions. 
This Article also considers corporate culture and whether the 
environment at entrepreneurial or risk-aggressive firms poses a bar-
rier to effective risk-management practices.
12
  Most commentators ac-
knowledge that some risk taking is healthy and often necessary to en-
hancing firm performance.
13
  The goal of risk management should 
not be the elimination of all risk, but rather the pursuit of prudent 
and informed risk profiling and decision making.  The challenge 
then is to convince firms that value and reward successful high-risk 
endeavors that risk management can enhance their decisions without 
changing their profit-oriented objectives. 
 
 10 For a general discussion of cognitive biases and decision making, see Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCIENCE 1124 (1974).  See also infra Part IV.A. 
 11 See infra Parts IV, V. 
 12 For a general discussion of corporate culture, see Alice Belcher, Imagining How 
a Company Thinks: What is Corporate Culture?, 11 DEAKIN L. REV. 1, 18 (2006).  See also 
infra Part IV.B. 
 13 See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT 7 (2007) (“A business that decides to protect itself against all risk is un-
likely to generate much upside for its owners; however, a business that exposes itself 
to the wrong types of risk may be even worse off, because it is more likely to be dam-
aged than helped by the risk exposure.”); Diane Brady, Sarbanes-Oxley = a Downturn in 
Corporate Risk-Taking, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
careers/managementiq/archives/2007/09/sarbanes-oxley.html (discussing the need 
for risk taking to spur economic growth and citing two academic papers suggesting 
that the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 reduced risk taking); Donald L. Kohn, Fed. Re-
serve Bank, Address at the Official Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Ban-
que Centrale du Luxembourg (Nov. 12, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20081112a.htm) (“A cen-
tral challenge will be to structure financial oversight to both deter unwanted and ex-
cessive risk-taking and permit the innovation that can ultimately boost economic 
growth.”).  
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This Article evaluates these complex issues in the context of en-
terprise risk management (“ERM”).
14
  As explained below, ERM is a 
holistic approach to risk management that goes beyond financial risk 
modeling and seeks to integrate a firm’s risk assessment and response 
practices.
15
  It also is a form of risk management that holds value for 
firms outside of the financial and insurance industries.  Consequent-
ly, although this Article uses financial institution examples from the 
2008 recession, the analysis and suggested prescriptions apply across 
industries and have far broader implications than simply addressing 
the fallout from the recession.
16
 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the ERM move-
ment, discussing its origins, key components, and perceived role in 
the 2008 recession.  Part III summarizes the various regulatory and 
judicial responses to the 2008 recession that involve some aspect of 
risk management.  Part IV presents a case study of Citigroup Inc. and 
analyzes its decision-making process during the 2008 recession in 
light of events and developments in its industry and the economy 
more generally at the time.  Part V then uses the Citigroup case study 
to evaluate the impact of cognitive biases and corporate culture on 
risk-management decisions.  This analysis leads to a discussion of po-
tential regulatory and market responses to strengthen the ERM 
movement.  This Article concludes by encouraging policymakers and 
corporate boards to consider cognitive biases and the importance of 
corporate culture as part of their risk-management dialogue. 
II. OVERVIEW OF ERM 
Risk often is defined simply as “the possibility of loss or injury.”
17
  
In the business context, the concept of risk includes not only the 
probability of loss but also the consequences of that loss or risk 
 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 See id.; see also COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2004), 
available at http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_Executive 
Summary.pdf [hereinafter COSO REPORT] (describing ERM framework).  
 16 See, e.g., Steven J. Dreyer & Amra Balic, Progress Report: Integrating Enterprise Risk 
Management Analysis into Corporate Credit Ratings, STANDARD & POOR’S, July 22, 2009, at 
2, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/events/ 
IntegratingERM72209.pdf (“In May 2008, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services an-
nounced its intention to include enterprise risk management (“ERM”) assessments 
in ratings of nonfinancial companies.”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 17–18 (discuss-
ing broad utility of ERM and emphasizing its application in the context of non-
financial firms). 
 17 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1018 (9th ed. 1985). 
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event.
18
  Managing quantifiable risk is a much easier task than consi-
dering unquantifiable risk.  Nevertheless, as suggested by the 2008 
recession, prudent risk management needs to consider both.
19
 
Yet taking this type of broad, all-encompassing approach to 
managing business risk is a relatively new development.
20
  Traditional-
ly, financial institutions and insurance companies used risk-
management techniques to hedge financial risk exposures.
21
  Risk 
managers at those companies would analyze the specific type of risk 
assigned to them (e.g., credit, market, foreign currency, etc.) and de-
sign or purchase financial products to mitigate that risk.
22
  Risk man-
agers rarely discussed or assessed the company’s overall risk profile; 
rather, risk management was confined to separate and individual si-
los.
23
  Any meaningful consideration of risk management was even 
rarer outside of the financial and insurance industries.  ERM seeks to 
address these limitations.  This Part provides an overview of the ERM 
theory, its application in practice, and its perceived role in the 2008 
recession. 
 
 18 DAMODARAN, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 19 “Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; everything that 
counts cannot necessarily be counted.”  Albert Einstein.  See also NASSIM NICHOLAS 
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007) (discussing 
challenges of identifying and addressing surprise risk events); CROWE HORWATH, 
AVOIDING THE BLACK SWAN: BARRIERS TO IMPROVING RISK MANAGEMENT (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.cfo.com/whitepapers/index.cfm/download/14467404 (describing 
a study showing challenges with risk management highlighted by the 2008 recession, 
including surprise risk events).  
 20 As discussed below, COSO introduced its first proposal for a comprehensive 
risk management or ERM framework in 2004.  See COSO REPORT, supra note 15; see 
also infra Part II.A. 
 21 See, e.g., DAMODARAN, supra note 13, at 3–5 (describing origins of risk manage-
ment); DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT’S BROKEN 
AND HOW TO FIX IT 21–35 (2009) (same); THOMAS L. BARTON ET AL., MAKING 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT PAY OFF 11 (2002) (discussing silo approach to risk 
management); Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management 
and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 581 (2008) (same); see also CFO 
RESEARCH SERVS. & IBM CORP., THINKING THROUGH UNCERTAINTY: CFOS SCRUTINIZE 
NON-FINANCIAL RISK 4 (2007), available at https://www-
935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/ibm-risk-mgmt-final-032807.pdf (exploring 
proposition that “[c]ompanies seek a more expansive view of the risks that place 
their business performance in jeopardy”).  For an explanation of the financial risk 
modeling technique commonly used by firms, called “Value at Risk” or VaR, and 
viewed as flawed in the context of the 2008 recession, see Nocera, supra note 3. 
 22 See, e.g., Gabriele Sabato, Financial Crisis:  Where Did Risk Management Fail?, at 3–
4, available at http://www.fma.org/NY/Papers/Financial_crisis_RM_failure_final.pdf. 
 23 See supra note 21. 
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A. Development of ERM 
Although the Barings Bank and Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment meltdowns highlighted risk-management flaws, it was the 
Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate scandals of the early 2000s 
that sparked a call for more comprehensive risk management.
24
  For 
example, in describing the internal controls adopted by Enron to 
manage risks associated with related-party transactions, the report of 
the Enron Special Investigation Committee observed that the “con-
trols as designed were not rigorous enough, and their implementa-
tion and oversight was inadequate at both the Management and 
Board levels.”
25
  The report concluded that Enron’s board failed “to 
demand more information, and . . . to probe and understand the in-
formation that did come to it.”
26
  The response to Enron and similar 
governance failures was swift and emerged in at least two separate 
forms: new risk-related disclosure regulations and redefined best 
practices.
27
 
Risk-related regulations were included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, the listing standards for the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”), and the U.S. Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines.  
The most extensive of these regulations is section 404 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, which requires management to explain and assess 
the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting.
28
  Section 406 of the Act also requires reporting companies 
 
 24 See generally Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 
417 (2008) (discussing the business practices leading to the Enron scandal and the 
Congressional actions that followed); Robert Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003) (discussing the corporate 
governance problems of Enron as a redesigned corporation and its risk-management 
practices); J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the 
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (2003) 
(discussing Worldcom’s fraud and bankruptcy and the implications on the telecom-
munications industry); see also supra note 1. 
 25 WILLIAM C. POWERS JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 10 (2002), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/index.html. 
 26 Id. at 23.  The United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
reached similar conclusions, faulting Enron’s board for approving “new business ven-
tures and complex transactions” with insufficient information and oversight.  See Ro-
sen, supra note 24, at 1170. 
 27 See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Foreword: After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 229 (2003) (explaining the events lead-
ing up to the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the regulatory and legislative 
responses). 
 28 See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sar-
banes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 142 (2006) (explaining the 
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to adopt a code of ethics for its senior officers or explain why it does 
not have a code.
29
  The NYSE listing standards address both internal 
controls and codes of ethics and specifically identifies risk assessment 
as an audit committee responsibility.
30
  Moreover, the Sentencing 
Guidelines offer reduced penalties for companies that demonstrate 
effective compliance programs that, among other things, incorporate 
ongoing risk assessment practices.
31
 
To assist companies in meeting these various requirements, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commis-
sion (“COSO”) developed a more comprehensive framework for risk-
management practices referred to as ERM.
32
  COSO defines ERM as 
[A] process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, manage-
ment and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across 
the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may af-
fect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives.
33
 
 
impact of the Act, including Section 404 on corporations); see also Larry E. Ribstein, 
Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003) (same). 
 29 See 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006); Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: 
Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 367, 380–81 (2008) (exploring the requirements of Section 406); see also 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Gover-
nance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1202–03 (2003) (discussing various requirements of the 
Act, including the code of ethics). 
 30 See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL; Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative 
Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003) (explaining and analyzing changes to listing standards). 
 31 See generally David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes Oxley & the Or-
ganizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781 (2007) (explaining and ana-
lyzing changes to sentencing guidelines); David Hess et al., The 2004 Amendments to 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Busi-
ness Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725 (2006). 
 32 A detailed explanation of the components of ERM is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Nevertheless, the COSO report contains those details and additional infor-
mation.  See COSO REPORT, supra note 15.  In certain respects, ERM resembles prior 
organizational literature by emphasizing the need to restructure how firms conceive 
and utilize knowledge, information, and channels of communication.  See, e.g., JAMES 
CHAMPY & MICHAEL HAMMER, REENGINEERING THE CORPORATION:  A MANIFESTO FOR 
BUSINESS REVOLUTION (2003); PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE—THE ART AND 
PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990); PETER M. SENGE ET AL., THE DANCE 
OF CHANGE:  THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINING MOMENTUM IN LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS 
(1999).  ERM tries, however, to offer a simplified process for implementing the ne-
cessary changes and improving firm culture and governance.  See infra Part II.B.  Al-
though initial reports suggest that ERM is effective, the longevity of the movement 
remains to be seen.  See supra note 4; infra notes 52–55.  
 33 COSO REPORT, supra note 15, at 2 (emphasis in original); see Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 3, at 7.  Federal Reserve Bank Governor Susan Bies defined ERM as “a process 
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ERM is a holistic approach to risk management that considers strateg-
ic and operational risks in addition to financial risks and focuses on 
identifying, assessing, and responding to risk events.
34
 
ERM takes a top-down approach to risk management.
35
  COSO 
and other commentators stress the importance of the board’s and se-
nior management’s role in ERM.
36
  Under this framework, the board 
and senior management are critical in creating a risk culture at the 
firm (i.e., a culture that values and rewards meaningful assessment 
and communication regarding risk events).
37
  The board also plays an 
important role in setting the firm’s risk appetite and designing and 
 
that enables management to deal effectively with uncertainty and the associated risk 
and opportunity, enhancing the capacity to build stakeholder value.”  Susan Schmidt 
Bies, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the National Credit Union Administration 2007 
Risk Mitigation Summit on Enterprise Risk Management and Mortgage Lending 
(Jan. 11, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/Bies20070111a.htm). 
 34 ERM generally targets all potential risk events, including financial risks, opera-
tional risks, business risks, litigation risks, and governance and human resource risks.  
See, e.g., CAROLYN KAY ET AL., [CONFERENCE BD.], THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS 
IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 11 (2006) [hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT], 
available at http://www.ucop.edu/riskmgt/erm/documents/role_uscorpboards.pdf; 
see also Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 584 (“Under ERM, risks can be viewed as 
falling into two broad areas: core risks (risks which a firm should have a competitive 
advantage to handle in their business model) and non-core risks (risks which could 
be hedged by the business or transferred through risk management techniques).”).  
“ERM consists of eight interrelated components, which are derived from the way 
management runs an enterprise and integrated with the management process: (1) 
internal environment, (2) objective setting, (3) event identification, (4) risk assess-
ment, (5) risk response, (6) control activities, (7) information and communication, 
and (8) monitoring.”  Bies, supra note 33; COSO REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 35 See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N (COSO), 
STRENGTHENING ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT FOR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE 4–5, 17 
(2009), available at http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO_09_board_position 
_final102309PRINTandWEBFINAL.pdf [hereinafter COSO PAPER]; RIMS PAPER, su-
pra note 3, at 9. 
 36 CONFERENCE BD., EMERGING GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT 8–9, 13–17 (2007); CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 34, at 15–18; 
see also infra Part III.A. 
 37 John Michael Farrell & Angela Hoon, What’s Your Company’s Risk Culture?, 
NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRECTORS DIRECTORSHIP, April 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/index.php/articles/entry/risk-culture-companies 
(“Risk culture is the system of values and behaviors present in an organization that 
shapes risk decisions of management and employees.”); Peter Green & Jeremy Jen-
nings-Mares, IIF’s Final Report on Market Best Practices for Financial Institutions and Fi-
nancial Products, BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP., Sept. 2008, at 1 (“Cultivation of a 
consistent ‘risk culture’ throughout firms is the most important element in risk man-
agement.”); COSO PAPER, supra note 35, at 4–5. 
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monitoring the firm’s ERM program.
38
  Many commentators view 
COSO’s ERM framework as best practices in business risk-
management practices. 
Notably, despite the regulatory and industry endorsements for 
enhanced risk-management practices, corporate boards voiced resis-
tance to the concept.
39
  Many directors opined that extensive risk-
management procedures were unnecessary or too cumbersome; oth-
ers resisted any mandated approach to risk management.
40
  Studies 
suggest that these sentiments linger in corporate boardrooms even 
after the 2008 recession.
41
 
B. Implementation of ERM 
The design and implementation of ERM is firm specific but gen-
erally involves the board of directors and senior management first 
mapping the firm’s business strategies and risks.  “Developing an un-
derstanding of the linkages between top risk exposures and key strat-
egies and objectives can help both management . . . and risk over-
 
 38 See, e.g., Barker, supra note 3 (explaining that boards should “(i) evaluat[e] the 
risks associated with corporate strategies, (ii) defin[e] the risk appetite of the com-
pany, [and] (iii) ensur[e] that appropriate resources are devoted to risk identifica-
tion, avoidance, and mitigation”); CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 34, at 6–7 
(recommending six primary tasks for boards considering ERM); COSO REPORT, su-
pra note 15, at 6–7 (defining role of board in ERM). 
 39 See RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 6; Richard Clune, ERM: A Status Report, 
INTERNAL AUDITOR, Feb. 1, 2005, available at http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/ 
documents/ERMJFAPaper21306.pdf  (describing a study finding that less than half 
of respondents adopted ERM-like procedures); Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 
584–85 (“Evidence from studies and surveys indicates that, to date, only about 10% 
of major companies claim to have implemented many aspects of ERM, while almost 
all the others claim that they plan to do so in the future.”). 
 40 See, e.g., CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 34, at 18 (noting that “many 
directors interviewed resisted what they termed ‘an excessively formal’ way to incor-
porate risk management into their deliberations”). 
 41 See, e.g., HORWATH, supra note 19, at 4 (describing a study finding that one-
third of respondents view risk management “as an unnecessary interference with 
business activities”); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
BENCHMARKING SURVEY 6 (2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/fi_FI 
/fi/julkaisut/tiedostot/erm_benchmarking_survey_2008.pdf (explaining that ap-
proximately 31% of respondents did not have risk management practices in place); 
Audit Committees Put Risk Management at the Top of Their Agendas, KPMG (June 16, 
2008), http://www.kpmg.co.uk/news/detail.cfm?pr=3120 (describing a study finding 
that only 46%  of respondents were very satisfied with risk practices); Financial Crisis 
Intensifies Interest in Risk Management Among CFOs, TOWERS PERRIN (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/showdctmdoc.jsp?country=global&url=Master_Bra
nd_2/USA/News/Spotlights/2008/Sept/2008_09_30_spotlight_cfo_survey.htm (ex-
plaining that “72% of respondents expressed concern about their own company’s 
risk management practices and ability to meet strategic plans”).  
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sight by identifying where risks are overlapping within an individual 
strategy and where certain risks may affect multiple strategies.”
42
  With 
this information, the board and management can evaluate the firm’s 
portfolio of key risks—assessing the impact and likelihood of each 
risk event—and set the firm’s risk appetite.
43
 
The core elements of the ERM program then revolve around ef-
ficient and effective communication channels and active monitoring 
of the firm’s risks against its risk portfolio and risk appetite.
44
  Com-
mentators stress the need for risk managers to have direct access to 
the board and multiple contact points to encourage the free-flow of 
information and reduce the likelihood that risk reports are presented 
but not heard.
45
  Firms also are encouraged to develop key risk indi-
cators that facilitate more effective monitoring of potential risk 
events.
46
 
C. ERM and the 2008 Recession 
The 2008 recession revealed significant weaknesses in existing 
risk-management practices.
47
  Risk-management failures alone did not 
trigger the recession, but many commentators identify such failures 
as contributing to the severity of the economic losses.  For example, 
Chairman Ben Bernanke stated: “Among other things, our analysis 
reaffirms that capital adequacy, effective liquidity planning, and 
strong risk management are essential for safe and sound banking; 
the . . . [recession] revealed serious deficiencies on the part of some 
 
 42 COSO PAPER, supra note 35, at 13. 
 43 Id. at 14–15. 
 44 Id.  
 45 See supra Part II.A and infra Part III.A. 
 46 COSO PAPER, supra note 35, at 17–18 (“Key risk indicators . . . are metrics used 
by some organizations to provide an early signal of increasing risk exposure in vari-
ous areas of organization.”). 
 47 Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 7 (“Despite the importance given to risk manage-
ment by regulators and corporate governance principles, the financial turmoil has 
revealed severe shortcomings in practices both in internal management and in the 
role of the board in overseeing risk management systems at a number of banks.”); see 
also supra note 3.  For example, a study revealed that risk managers at UBS AG were 
aware of potential losses in the firm’s subprime mortgage holdings in early 2007 but 
did not advise senior executives of these potential losses until July 2007.  Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 3, at 11.  Moreover, UBS’s board did not learn of the firm’s financial situa-
tion until August 2007.  Id. at 11–12.  UBS subsequently acknowledged that “[a]s a 
result of [risk management] weaknesses, the firm failed to adequately assess corre-
lated risks and risk concentrations.”  UBS AG, ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 20-F FOR 
2009, at 120 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ubs.com/1/e/ 
investors/sec_filings.html. 
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financial institutions in one or more of the areas.”
48
  Similarly, the 
Chairman of Morgan Stanley, John Mack, testified before the Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission that “[i]n retrospect, many firms were 
too highly leveraged, took on too much risk and did not have suffi-
cient resources to manage those risks effectively in a rapidly changing 
environment.”
49
 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint one key deficiency in existing 
risk-management practices, a lack of integration and communication 
appears to be one of the most significant problems.
50
  The traditional 
segregated approach to risk management prevented many firms from 
understanding their true exposure if various identified risks con-
verged and from communicating those risks efficiently to senior ex-
ecutives and directors.
51
  Consequently, firms’ responses to the chang-
ing financial landscape during 2007–2008 were slow and in many 
cases too late. 
At least one study suggests that financial institutions with more 
integrated risk-management programs performed better during the 
2008 recession.
52
  The study posits that these firms communicated in-
formation throughout the organization more efficiently and were 
able to implement necessary changes more effectively.
53
  A nimble re-
sponse to a risk event can preserve significant value.
54
  More studies 
and data are needed to evaluate fully the impact of ERM, but initial 
studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that ERM provides more time-
 
 48 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 7, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20090507a.htm). 
 49 Highlights: Quotes from U.S. Financial Crisis Commission Hearing, REUTERS, Jan. 13, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C3AI20100113. 
 50 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 8–12. 
 51 See Harner, supra note 3, at 50–51 (describing silo approach to risk manage-
ment and its role in the 2008 recession). 
 52 SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE (2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/ssg_risk_mgt_doc_fin
al.pdf.  The study concluded that “[f]irms that avoided . . . [significant] problems 
demonstrated a comprehensive approach to viewing firm-wide exposures and risk, 
sharing quantitative and qualitative information more efficiently across the firm and 
engaging in more effective dialogue across the management team.”  Id.; see also Kirk-
patrick, supra note 3, at 8 (summarizing findings of the Senior Supervisors Group 
Study).    
 53 See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 52. 
 54 See, e.g., RIMS Paper, supra note 3, at 3–4 (explaining the impact of risk man-
agement failures on firms during the 2008 recession and how to address those is-
sues). 
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ly information to boards and senior management and thus may better 
equip them to respond both proactively and reactively to risk events.
55
 
III. RISK-MANAGEMENT REPONSES TO THE 2008 RECESSION 
By most accounts, the 2008 recession was the most significant re-
cession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
56
  The economic 
losses were steep and the recovery slow.  The International Monetary 
Fund estimates that global financial institutions lost approximately 
$4.05 trillion in value, with $2.7 trillion of that relating to loans origi-
nating in the United States.
57
  The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics es-
timates that the United States lost approximately 8.4 million jobs dur-
ing the recession, with the U.S. unemployment rate hovering 
between nine to ten percent since 2009.
58
 
Not surprisingly, policymakers and commentators are scrutiniz-
ing the causes of the 2008 recession and searching for ways to avoid, 
or at least mitigate, the next economic downturn.
59
  Some of this dis-
cussion has focused on risk management and improving firms’ risk-
 
 55 See, e.g., Kurt A. Desender, The Influence of Board Composition, Audit Fees 
and Ownership Concentration on Enterprise Risk Management (Oct. 2007) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1025982 (exploring value components of ERM); Robert E. Hoyt & Andre 
P. Liebenberg, The Value of Enterprise Risk Management 1 (July 29, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1440947 (describing a study finding “a positive relation between firm 
value and the use of ERM”); see also supra notes 39–41. 
 56 “The financial market crisis that erupted in August 2007 has developed into 
the largest financial shock since the Great Depression, inflicting heavy damage on 
markets and institutions at the core of the financial system.”  INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:  HOUSING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 4 (2008), available at 
http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
 57 Mark Landler, I.M.F. Puts Bank Losses from Global Financial Crisis at $4.1 Trillion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/ 
business/global/22fund.html. 
 58 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
February 2010, at 1–2 (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/empsit.pdf. 
 59 See, e.g., Patrice Hill, CEOs Trade Blame with Congress over Financial Crisis, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2010/jan/14/ceos-trade-blame-with-congress-over-finance-crisis/ (“Wall Street 
clashed with Washington on Wednesday over the causes of the biggest financial crisis 
since the Great Depression, with political leaders and financial chieftains trying to 
cast the blame on each other.”); Dawn Kopecki & Matthew Leising, Derivatives Indus-
try Gets Second Look from Congress, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2009, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aTZhIZJYCeS8 (“Con-
gress will take a second shot at the derivatives industry after its decision nine years 
ago to forgo regulations led to a $592 trillion market that brought financial firms to 
their knees.”). 
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management practices.
60
  This Part highlights the developments re-
garding risk management as a result of the 2008 recession.  As dis-
cussed below, industry proponents are encouraging more attention 
to ERM, while regulatory responses focus on enhanced disclosure re-
garding risk management and governing risk through executive 
compensation schemes.  Part V then considers how neither approach 
fully accounts for the behavioral and cultural barriers to effective risk 
management. 
A. ERM as a Potential Solution 
In a speech in January 2007, Federal Reserve Bank Governor Su-
san Bies stated, “A successful enterprise risk-management process can 
help an organization meet many of [its] challenges by providing a 
framework within which managers can explicitly consider how the 
organization’s risk exposures are changing.”
61
  Governor Bies dis-
cussed the importance of ERM not only in the context of large finan-
cial institutions and subprime-lending practices but also as universal 
principles valuable to firms of all sizes in all industries.
62
  As she ex-
plained, 
[W]hether someone is designing a new branch office, shipping 
tapes to a backup site for storage, developing the layout for a 
newspaper ad, or training new employees, they [should] con-
sciously think about risk as one of the elements of that business 
activity.  Increased risk awareness by staff throughout the enter-
prise is integral to managing risk successfully.
63
 
Many commentators agree with Governor Bies’ focus on firm-
wide risk responsibility and the creation of a risk culture within firms 
as a response to the 2008 recession.  In 2009, COSO issued a thought 
paper, titled Strengthening Enterprise Risk Management for Strategic Ad-
vantage, to assist boards in strengthening risk-management practices 
and complying with anticipated regulatory mandates on risk man-
 
 60 See, e.g., Mary Schapiro, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Council of Insti-
tutional Investors (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2009/spch040609mls.htm. (“The Commission will be considering whether greater 
disclosure is needed about how a company — and the company’s board in particular 
— manages risks, both generally and in the context of setting compensation.”). 
 61 Bies, supra note 33.  Governor Bies identified those challenges as including 
“emerging technologies and business processes, new financial instruments, the grow-
ing scale and scope of financial institutions, and changing regulatory frameworks.”  
Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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agement, such as the SEC rule on proxy disclosure enhancement.
64
  
Much of the thought paper discusses the importance of the board’s 
role in ERM and provides guidance for boards in fulfilling that role.
65
  
COSO explains that “[b]ecause management is accountable to the 
board of directors, the board’s focus on effective risk oversight is crit-
ical to setting the tone and culture towards effective risk management 
through strategy setting, formulating high-level objectives, and ap-
proving broad-based resource allocations.”
66
 
Specifically, COSO identifies four areas of risk-related tasks for 
boards: (1) “[d]iscuss risk-management philosophy and risk appe-
tite;” (2) “[u]nderstand enterprise risk-management practices;” (3) 
“[r]eview portfolio of risks in relation to risk appetite;” and (4) “[b]e 
apprised of the most significant risks and related responses.”
67
  This 
type of board involvement provides more information to directors 
and can help them better understand the overall business enterprise.  
It also signals to management and others at the firm the importance 
of risk responsibility and the need to align the firm’s risk appetite 
with its business strategies. 
Other commentators suggest that ERM, as opposed to more tra-
ditional financial risk management, can facilitate a more complete 
risk assessment that captures at some level what generally is viewed as 
unquantifiable risk.  Speaking to this point, the Risk and Insurance 
Management Society, Inc. (“RIMS”) observed, “A number of actu-
aries, financial managers and consultants regularly advocate a primar-
ily ‘scientific’ and quantifiable approach for enterprise risk manage-
ment.  Certain financial institutions seem to have replaced sound 
business judgment with this ‘scientific’ approach.”
68
  RIMS perceives 
ERM as a means of reintroducing sound business judgment to the 
risk-management process, allowing firms to identify and respond 
 
 64 See COSO PAPER, supra note 35.  For a discussion of the SEC rule on proxy dis-
closure enhancement, see infra Part II.B.1. 
 65 See COSO PAPER, supra note 35. 
 66 Id. at 4. 
 67 Id. at 5. 
 68 RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 5.  RIMS faults over-reliance on historic controls 
and risk metrics for some of the losses experienced during the 2008 recession.  Id. at 
6.  It posits that “[t]here was a failure to embed enterprise risk management best 
practices from the top all the way down to the trading floor, with the mistaken as-
sumption that there is only one way to view a particular risk.”  Id. at 7; see also Nocera, 
supra note 3, at 9 (discussing flaws in relying solely on VaR and noting that, in the 
context of the 2008 recession, “[i]nstead of scrutinizing VaR for signs of impending 
trouble, they took comfort in a number and doubled down, putting more money at 
risk in the expectation of bigger gains”). 
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more effectively and efficiently to both quantifiable and unquantifia-
ble risks.
69
 
A report prepared for the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development reached similar conclusions regarding 
the 2008 recession and the value of ERM in that context.
70
  The re-
port urges more emphasis on the corporate governance or human 
component of risk management and suggests ERM as a technique for 
achieving that objective.
71
  Among other things, the report stresses 
the need for better understanding of and communication regarding 
risks, noting that “[e]ven if risk-management systems in the technical 
sense are functioning, it will not impact the company unless the 
transmission of information is through effective channels, a clear 
corporate governance issue.”
72
 
In addition, Standard & Poor’s has integrated ERM assessment 
into its ratings analysis.
73
  For example, Standard & Poor’s is inter-
viewing its rated, nonfinancial issuers regarding their ERM practices.
74
  
The questions asked during these interviews concern: (1) the com-
pany’s process for identifying top risks; (2) how often that process 
takes place; (3) how those risks are managed; (4) who is responsible 
for risk management; (5) the board’s role in risk management; and 
(6) how the company has responded to unexpected information in 
its industry.
75
  Standard & Poor’s and ERM proponents generally view 
 
 69 RIMS PAPER, supra note 3. 
 70 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 4. 
 71 Id. at 2 (“The risk management systems have failed in many cases due to cor-
porate governance procedures rather than the inadequacy of computer models 
alone: information about exposures in a number of cases did not reach the board 
and even senior levels of management, while risk management was often activity ra-
ther than enterprise-based.”). 
 72 Id. at 11. 
 73 Big Changes in Standard & Poor’s Rating Criteria, STANDARD & POOR’S, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/erm/en/us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) 
(“Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services has expanded its review of the financial service 
industry’s enterprise risk management (ERM) practices.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Dreyer & Balic, supra note 16, at 2 (“Since the third quarter of last 
year, our analysts 
have begun to incorporate specific ERM discussions into their regular meetings with 
the companies we rate, focusing on risk-management culture and strategic-risk man-
agement as two universally applicable aspects of ERM.”); AON GLOBAL RISK 
CONSULTING, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: S&P ENHANCEMENT WHITE PAPER 3 
(2009), available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments 
/risk-services/enterprise_risk_management_enhancement_white_paper.pdf [herei-
nafter AON PAPER].  
 75 See, e.g., Dreyer & Balic, supra note 16, at 2–3 (identifying seven key questions 
for company interviews and noting that Standard & Poor’s “analysts have explored 
managements’ views of the most consequential risks that their firms face, their like-
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the ERM framework as an important tool for mitigating future eco-
nomic downturns through better information flow and core cultural 
changes.
76
 
B. Risk-Related Policy 
Even before the extent of the 2008 recession was apparent, U.S. 
federal financial regulatory agencies issued Interagency Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (“Interagency Guidance”) 
that emphasized the importance of risk management with respect to 
nontraditional mortgage products, including subprime mortgages.
77
  
The Interagency Guidance, dated September 29, 2006, observed that 
“risk layering, combined with the broader marketing of nontradition-
al mortgage loans, exposes financial institutions to increased risk rel-
ative to traditional mortgage loans.”
78
  It urged financial institutions 
to adopt rigorous risk-management practices that closely monitor the 
volume and volatility of nontraditional mortgage loan originations 
and investments.
79
  Among other guidelines, it suggested that finan-
cial institutions “[m]aintain capital at levels that reflect portfolio cha-
racteristics and the effect of stressed economic conditions on collec-
tability.”
80
 
Nevertheless, many financial institutions failed to implement the 
types of controls, monitoring, and communication procedures rec-
ommended by the Interagency Guidance.  For example, despite the 
warning that nontraditional mortgage products may not perform well 
in a stressed environment, and that firms should consider collectabili-
ty issues, many financial institutions did not account for a decline in 
the housing market in their financial risk modeling.
81
  Likewise, 
 
lihood of occurring, how these top risks are identified, monitored, and updated, and 
the influence of risk sensitivity on liability management and financing decisions”); 
AON PAPER, supra note 74, at 4. 
 76 See, e.g., Dreyer & Balic, supra note 16, at 2 (explaining the purpose of ERM 
consideration); AON PAPER, supra note 74, at 4. 
 77 Memorandum from Scott M. Albinson to Chief Executive Officers, Interagency 
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (Oct. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/25244.pdf. 
 78 Id. at 2. 
 79 Id. at 1–2, 4.   
 80 Id. at 6. 
 81 See, e.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made 
Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?pagewanted=1 (“Citi-
group’s risk models never accounted for the possibility of a national housing down-
turn, this person said, and the prospect that millions of homeowners could default 
on their mortgages.”); Nocera, supra note 3, at 10 (“The fact that [risk models] 
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communication between risk managers and senior management was 
delayed, incomplete, or both. 
In response, policymakers introduced several risk-related initia-
tives, and the courts weighed in on the issue as well.  As discussed be-
low, many of the regulatory responses focus on increased disclosure 
regarding risk-management practices and regulating risk through re-
strictions on executive compensation schemes.  This Part also dis-
cusses the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in the Citigroup liti-
gation, which posits a low threshold for boards’ risk oversight 
responsibilities and, consequently, may underscore the need to ex-
plore disclosure, executive compensation, and other alternative 
means to help regulators and markets monitor firms’ risk-
management practices. 
1. Proposed or Adopted Regulatory Responses 
In May 2009, Senator Charles Schumer introduced the Share-
holder Bill of Rights Act of 2009 in the Senate (“Shareholder Bill”).
82
  
The stated purpose of the Shareholder Bill was “[t]o provide share-
holders with enhanced authority over the nomination, election, and 
compensation of public company executives.”
83
  Section 5 of the 
Shareholder Bill provides that reporting companies shall “establish a 
risk committee, comprised entirely of independent directors, which 
shall be responsible for the establishment and evaluation of the risk 
management practices of the issuer.”
84
 
In addition, in December 2009, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) addressed risk-management practices in its final 
rule on proxy disclosure enhancement.
85
  The rule requires reporting 
companies to discuss their general risk-management practices and 
 
didn’t measure the possibility of an extreme event was a blessing to the executives.  It 
made black swans all the easier to ignore.”); Eric S. Rosengren, Fed. Reserve Boston, 
Address at The Global Interdependence Center’s Conference on Financial Interde-
pendence in the World’s Post-Crisis Capital Markets (Mar. 3, 2010) (transcript avail-
able at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2010/030310/index.htm) 
(“There is evidence that financial institutions understood the risks that would arise if 
house prices fell, but assigned too low a probability to this potential outcome.  Thus 
they were woefully unprepared to weather the consequences when prices did indeed 
fall.”).  
 82 Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 83 Id. § 5. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Final Rule: Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68334-01 (Dec. 16, 
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 249). 
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how their compensation schemes relate to risk profiles.
86
  It also 
mandates a disclosure regarding the board’s role in and oversight of 
risk management.
87
  The SEC posits that “disclosure about the board’s 
involvement in the oversight of the risk management process should 
provide important information to investors about how a company 
perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the 
board and senior management in managing the material risks facing 
the company.”
88
 
Also in December 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives ap-
proved the Wall Street Reform Act and Consumer Protection Act of 
2009 (“Wall Street Act”).
89
  The Wall Street Act addresses risk man-
agement in the context of executive compensation.
90
  Specifically, it 
grants regulators extensive authority to assess whether a firm’s com-
pensation scheme “is aligned with sound risk management” and “to 
prescribe joint regulations prohibiting any feature of any incentive-
based arrangement that encourages such inappropriate risks.”
91
  Oth-
er regulations relate risk to executive compensation and seek to con-
trol risk through firms’ compensation schemes.
92
 
 
 86 Id. at 68336-7. 
 87 Id. at 68344-45. 
 88 Id. at 68345. 
 89 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 90 Id.   
 91 Id. § 2004. 
 92 For example, the TARP legislation and the Federal Reserve Bank’s proposed 
guidance on incentive compensation practices also seek to ensure that compensation 
incentives do not encourage inappropriate risk taking.  For a thoughtful discussion 
of those and other regulations governing risk through compensation practices, see 
Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk-Taking 13–21 (Mar. 1, 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1562018&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter.  Although this Article 
does not focus on the relation between risk and compensation structures, that factor 
is an important consideration in designing and evaluating any risk management pro-
gram, including ERM.  Several commentators have addressed this relationship.  See, 
e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 
(2010); Douglas O. Edwards, Comment, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk 
Management Incentives After the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247 
(2010); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 183 (2009); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation (Mar. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546229. 
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2. The Judicial Response 
As discussed above, several proposed regulatory responses to the 
2008 recession focus on executive compensation.
93
  The relation be-
tween risk and executive compensation is an important component 
of any risk-management program, including ERM.
94
  Several com-
mentators, however, have observed significant flaws in trying to re-
duce risk and achieve financial stability through compensation 
reform.
95
  In fact, such an approach appears incomplete at best.
96
  
Nonetheless, public outrage over executive compensation during the 
2008 recession and the perceived difficulty in enhancing board over-
sight duties under state law likely influenced the compensation-
reform approach. 
Consider the views of the Delaware Chancery Court in the In re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation.
97
  The court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions that “director defendants breached their duty of oversight ei-
 
 93  See supra Part III.B.1.   
 94 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Fed. Reserve, Address at the University of Maryland’s 
Robert H. Smith School of Business Roundtable on Executive Compensation: Prac-
tices and Reforms (Nov. 2, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20091102a.htm) (explain-
ing that “some firms gave loan officers incentives to write a lot of loans, or traders 
incentives to generate high levels of trading revenues, without sufficient regard for 
the risks associated with those activities,” and that those incentives undermine “the 
very foundation of sound risk management”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 14 (dis-
cussing components of compensation that might encourage short-termism and risk 
taking and noting that “the system of bonuses in investment banking provides incen-
tives for substantial risk taking while also allowing no flexibility for banks to reduce 
costs when they have to: at the upper end, the size of the bonus is unlimited while at 
the lower end it is limited to zero”); see also Aligning Risk Management and Executive 
Compensation, ENTERPRISE RISK MGMT. INITIATIVE, Dec. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/index.php/articles/entry/aligning-executive-
compensation (“A 2008 study conducted by The Wall Street Journal and ERI Eco-
nomic Research Institute found that the median CEO salary of a Standard and Poor’s 
500 company increased 20.5 percent from the previous year while corporate reve-
nues increased only 2.8 percent.”); Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 92, at 21–25 
(discussing additional empirical studies analyzing links between executive compensa-
tion and firm performance). 
 95 See Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 92, at 26–44 (criticizing prevailing views 
that “excessive” risk can be controlled through compensation-related reform on both 
functional and completeness grounds and discussing the difficulty with defining ex-
cessive risk and when regulating that risk might be socially desirable). 
 96 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 14–15 (explaining that alignment between 
compensation practices and long-term interests of firm does not necessarily improve 
risk assessment and noting that “one study . . . reports that financial institutions that 
collapsed had a CEO with high stock holdings so that they should normally have 
been risk averse, whereas the ones that survived had strong incentives to take risks”). 
 97 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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ther because the oversight mechanisms were not adequate or because 
the director defendants did not make a good faith effort to comply 
with the established oversight procedures.”
98
  The court discussed 
those allegations under the standard articulated in In re Caremark In-
ternational Inc. Derivative Litigation,
99
 Guttman v. Huang,
100
 and Stone v. 
Ritter.
101
  The court explained that “[t]he presumption of the business 
judgment rule, the protection of an exculpatory § 102(b)(7) provi-
sion, and the difficulty of proving a Caremark claim together function 
to place an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for 
personal director liability for a failure to see the extent of a compa-
ny’s business risk.”
102
 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s reluctance to impose liability on 
Citigroup’s directors for allegedly failed or inadequate risk-
management practices is consistent with the general notion that 
business decisions should be made in the boardroom and not the 
courtroom.
103
  It also reflects the complexity of assessing business risk 
and the delicate balance between risk and return.  As Chancellor 
Chandler stated, “Business decision-makers must operate in the real 
world, with imperfect information, limited resources, and an uncer-
tain future.  To impose liability on directors for making a ‘wrong’ 
business decision would cripple their ability to earn returns for inves-
tors by taking business risks.”
104
 
Although no liability resulted in the Citigroup case, the conduct 
of Citigroup and the individuals responsible for its risk-management 
activities prior to and during the 2008 recession make for a compel-
ling case study.  The information available to Citigroup’s executives 
 
 98 Id. at 127. 
 99 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 100 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 101 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).  ’Under this precedent, plaintiffs generally must 
show “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an 
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system ex-
ists.” In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.  For an excellent discussion of these three cases 
and their relation to failure to monitor claims, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark 
and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009). 
 102 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125. 
 103 See, e.g., Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 957 F.2d 203, 207 
(5th Cir. 1992) (“Under this familiar rule of American jurisprudence, the courts re-
frain from second guessing business decisions made by corporate directors in the ab-
sence of a showing of fraud, unfairness or overreaching.”);Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (“The judges are not business experts.”); see also Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 
95–100 (2004) (discussing development of business judgment rule). 
 104 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. 
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and how they used that information provides insight into corporate 
risk assessment and highlights cultural norms that may impede mea-
ningful ERM. 
IV. A CASE STUDY: CITIGROUP INC. 
Citigroup Inc. is a storied financial services firm.  With roots dat-
ing to 1812, Citigroup “has approximately 200 million customer ac-
counts and does business in more than 140 countries.”
105
  It provides a 
variety of financial products and services to its customers, including 
“consumer banking, credit cards, corporate and investment banking, 
securities brokerage and wealth management.”
106
  Citigroup carries 
approximately $1.857 trillion of assets and approximately $1.702 tril-
lion of liabilities on its balance sheet.
107
 
The 2008 recession hit Citigroup hard, notwithstanding, or per-
haps because of, its massive scope and size.  It experienced losses of 
approximately $10 billion by the start of the fourth quarter of 2007,
108
 
and the losses continued into 2009.
109
  Citigroup’s stock price 
dropped precipitously as well, falling to below $4 per share in No-
vember 2008 and below $1 per share in March 2009.
110
 
As a result, Citigroup accepted assistance from the U.S. govern-
ment under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).  Specifical-
ly, Citigroup received over $45 billion in capital infusions from the 
government, and the government agreed to guarantee approximately 
$306 billion in loans and securities.
111
  The government converted $25 
 
 105 Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm. 
 106 Id. at 7. 
 107 Id. at 39. 
 108 See Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Posts Record Loss on $18 Billion Writedown, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2008, 4:25 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=apcQNeUgOLwA.  
 109 See Eric Dash, After Year of Heavy Losses, Citigroup Finds a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/ 
business/18bank.html. 
 110 Dash & Creswell, supra note 81 (“Citigroup’s stock has plummeted to its lowest 
price in more than a decade, closing Friday [November 2008] at $3.77.”); Laurie Ku-
likowski, Citigroup Shares in Rally Mode, THESTREET.COM (Mar. 9, 2010, 3:49 PM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10698901/1/citigroup-shares-in-rally-mode.html. 
 111 See, e.g., David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 24, 2008, at A1, available at  http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122747680752551447.html?mod=djemalertNEWS (explaining $45 capital infusion 
and structure of U.S. loan guaranty). 
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billion of its investment into Citigroup common stock.
112
  Citigroup 
repaid the remaining $20 billion in December 2009.
113
 
Prior to its participation in TARP, Citigroup, its CEO (Charles 
Prince), its risk managers, and its board of directors made interesting 
decisions.  Despite various market and industry indications that the 
subprime-mortgage market was deteriorating quickly in early 2007, 
Citigroup stayed firmly committed to its large subprime mortgage 
and collateralized-debt obligation (“CDO”) portfolios and related in-
vestment strategies.
114
  In fact, in July 2007, Mr. Prince brushed aside 
these warnings and stated, “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got 
to get up and dance.  We’re still dancing.”
115
 
Mr. Prince’s statement is not the only evidence that Citigroup as 
an institution failed to appreciate or ignored the significance of the 
subprime-mortgage crisis.  Following the Bear Stearns collapse in the 
summer of 2007, Citigroup assured the SEC that it anticipated no 
subprime-mortgage losses.
116
  One report suggests that Citigroup in-
dicated that “the probability of those mortgages defaulting was so tiny 
that they excluded them from their risk analysis.”
117
  That approach 
proved devastating in October 2007 when Citigroup announced that 
“third-quarter profit would fall 60% from the prior year after huge 
write-downs for unsold debt it issued to finance corporate takeovers 
and for big losses on the value of subprime mortgage-backed securi-
ties.”
118
 
Standing alone, Citigroup’s position would not appear unrea-
sonable.  When placed in context with the other events of late 2006 
and early 2007, however, the position becomes more troubling.  Con-
 
 112 See, e.g., Eric Dash, U.S. Agrees to Raise Its Stake in Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/business/ 
28deal.html. 
 113 See, e.g., Matthias Rieker, Citigroup, Wells Repay TARP Funds—Banks’ Ability to 
Raise Capital is Sign of Health, Though Concerns About Financial Industry Linger, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 24, 2009, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704254604574614082322331944.html. 
 114 See, e.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 81 (explaining events leading up to Citi-
group’s announcement of significant losses in October 2007). 
 115 Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-
821c-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 116 See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Greg Morcroft, Big Write-Downs to Slash Citi’s Quarterly Net 60%, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
1, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/citigroup-says-quarterly-profit-to-drop-
60-but-shares-gain. 
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sider the following sampling of information known by or available to 
Citigroup executives:
119
 
• February 8, 2007: HSBC Holdings plc and New Century Fi-
nancial Corp. announce concerns regarding performance of 
their subprime-mortgage portfolios and perceived risks are re-
flected in ABX’s credit-default swap index.
120
 
• February 20, 2007: Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Bi-
es observes that “‘[o]ne segment of [the mortgage mar-
ket] . . . is starting to behave in a very problematic way and 
that is the subprime adjustable rate mortgages.’”
121
 
• February 21, 2007: NovaStar Financial Inc. loses one-third of 
its stock value due to subprime-mortgage issues.
122
 
• March 4, 2007: HSBC Holdings plc forced to take a $11 bil-
lion write-off to cover subprime-mortgage losses.
123
 
• March 12, 2007: Reports predict a significant surge in home 
foreclosures and that “[t]he deepest housing decline in 16 
years is about to get worse.”
124
 
• March 2007: Fremont General and New Century Financial 
stop making loans, and “People’s Choice files for bankrupt-
cy.”
125
 
 
 119 In addition to the sources noted below, information regarding this sample and 
other events relating to the 2008 recession during this and additional periods is pro-
vided in several excellent sources.  See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
MARKET CRISIS TIMELINE (July 2008), available at http://jec.senate.gov/ 
public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=4cdd7384-dbf6-40e6-adbc-789f69131903 [hereinafter 
Economic Committee Timeline]; Edward Harrison, Banking Crisis Timeline, CREDIT 
WRITEDOWNS, available at http://www.creditwritedowns.com/credit-crisis-
timeline/banking-crisis-timeline (last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Timeline: Banking Crisis, 
CNN (Oct. 16, 2008, 11:33 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/30/ 
us.bailout.timeline/index.html. 
 120 Jody Shenn & Shannon D. Harrington, Subprime Mortgage Bond Risks Surge, In-
dex Suggests, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2007, 5:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601103&sid=a3ztUp9Z6_UE&refer=us. 
 121 Bad Mortgage Debt Not Widespread Problem, Fed Official Says, USATODAY.COM (Feb. 
20, 2007, 3:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-02-
20-mortgage-debts-problems_x.htm. 
 122 Jody Shenn & Elizabeth Hester, NovaStar Sheds One-Third of Value After Posting 
Loss, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2007, 4:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=NFI:US&sid=aKFh3Eockz2k. 
 123 John Waples & Grant Ringshaw, US Triggers $11bn HSBC Fall-Out, SUNDAY 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article1465662.ece. 
 124 Bob Ivry, Foreclosures May Hit 1.5 Million in U.S. Housing Bust, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
12, 2007, 4:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087& 
sid=ahwzaBwuNaII&refer=home. 
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• April 6, 2007: “American Home Mortgage writes down the 
value of risky mortgages rated one step above subprime.”
126
 
• April 2007: New Century Financial files for bankruptcy, and 
GMAC LLC and General Electric Co. announce massive re-
ductions in workforce relating to subprime-mortgage busi-
nesses.
127
 
• May 3, 2007: UBS announces the closing of its hedge fund, 
Dillon Read Capital Management, due to U.S. subprime-
mortgage losses.
128
 
• May 30, 2007: Report suggests manipulation in subprime-
mortgage market and notes that “[s]ince the beginning of 
2006, more than 50 U.S. mortgage companies have put them-
selves up for sale, closed or declared bankruptcy.”
129
 
• June 12, 2007: Bear Stearns suspends redemptions at its 
hedge funds, which posted an 18.97 percent loss in April 
2007, and “RealtyTrac announces U.S. foreclosure filings 
surged 90 percent in May from May 2006.”
130
 
• July 2007: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch “downgrade 
bonds backed by subprime mortgages,” and Bear Stearns an-
nounces that its hedge funds are essentially worthless.
131
 
• July 18-19, 2007: Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Ben Ber-
nanke acknowledges that “there will be ‘significant losses’ due 
 
 125 Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 24. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Rachel Layne & Greg Bensinger, GMAC, GE Will Cut 1,400 Job Cuts on Subprime 
Decline, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2007, 7:56 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ammC8WlswFTQ&refer
=news; Top Lender in Chapter 11 Move, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2007, 4:14 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6519051.stm. 
 128 UBS to Close Its Hedge Fund Arm, BBC NEWS (May 3, 2007, 11:07 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6619033.stm. 
 129 Seth Lubove & Daniel Taub, Subprime Fiasco Exposes Manipulation by Mortgage 
Brokerages, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=a8VFwgtdQ9FM.  In addition, in April 
and June 2007, Standard & Poor’s issued warnings about the acceleration in sub-
prime mortgage payment defaults delinquencies.  See Insurance and Government Spon-
sored Enterprises: Hearing Before the H. SubComm. on Capital Markets, 109th Cong. 22 
(2006) (testimony of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President, Standard & Poor’s 
Credit Market Services). 
 130 Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Subprime Bath, BUSINESSWEEK, June 12, 2007, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2007/ 
db20070612_748264.htm; Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 23. 
 131 Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 22–23. 
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to subprime mortgages” and that “the problems ‘likely will get 
worse before they get better.’”
132
 
Admittedly, hindsight reveals information not always visible in 
the moment, but Citigroup faced fairly stark evidence in early to mid-
2007.
133
  Citigroup’s inaction is perhaps even more striking given that 
it held approximately $55 billion in U.S. subprime-mortgage assets at 
the time.
134
  In addition, “Citigroup was the biggest CDO underwriter, 
responsible for $46.9 billion of the securities sold in the first nine 
months” of 2007.
135
  Those holdings also led to significant write-downs 
in 2007.
136
 
The remainder of this Article considers the Citigroup scenario 
in the context of ERM and proposed and potential regulatory res-
ponses to the perceived risk-management failures associated with the 
2008 recession.
137
  It is easy to posit that better or more rigorous risk-
management procedures would have prevented the losses that both 
Citigroup shareholders and the markets more generally suffered, but 
it is much harder to prove that proposition.
138
  The existing law go-
verning corporate boards’ compliance obligations and the basic be-
havioral and cultural barriers that impede many decision-making 
processes only intensify that challenge
139
 
 
 132 Id. at 22.  Chairman Bernanke did observe that the subprime mortgage prob-
lems “have not spilled over into the greater system” and opined that the problems 
were “‘bumps’ in ‘market innovations.’”  Id. 
 133 See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in 
Legal Scholarship:  A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (1998) (explaining 
hindsight bias as “people over estimat[ing] the extent to which they could have pre-
dicted some future event (i.e., its foreseeability) once they learn what actually hap-
pened”); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[A]fter-the-fact liti-
gation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.”); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 
576 (1998) (“Research by cognitive psychologists has shown that the folk wisdom on 
hindsight is correct—past events seem more predictable than they really were.”).   
 134 Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Citi, SEC Are in Talks to Settle Asset Probe, WALL 
ST. J., May 28, 2009, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124347855330961363.html. 
 135 Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Fires CDO Bankers After Mortgage Losses, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 19, 2007, 5:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=aQmPC4T4g8Uo&refer=home. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See infra Part V.   
 138 Id. 
 139 See supra Part III.B.2 and infra Part V. 
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V. POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO THE ERM SOLUTION 
At its core, ERM strives to change corporate culture and improve 
information and communication regarding risk events.
140
  Those ob-
jectives alone, however, will not necessarily result in better risk man-
agement.
141
  Indeed, a firm could implement a process that projects 
an ERM façade but does nothing substantive to change the way deci-
sion makers consider and resolve risk issues.  Moreover, that process 
likely would satisfy existing and proposed risk regulations.
142
  As dis-
cussed above, those regulations focus primarily on disclosure regard-
ing risk-management practices and do not prescribe the content or 
scope of those practices. 
Accordingly, before firms adopt or policymakers mandate ERM, 
or any other risk-management protocol, all participants need to con-
sider whether more processes alone will improve risk management 
and enhance firm value or whether something else is needed.  Specif-
ically, will more reporting and information necessarily result in dif-
ferent or better decisions?  If not, how do we improve risk manage-
ment and does the law have a role to play in that process? 
A. Behavioral Barriers to Effective ERM 
Why did Citigroup keep dancing well into 2007?  Several key in-
dicators in its industry and the economy more generally suggested 
that caution was warranted.
143
  Some of its competitors observed these 
indicators and instituted responsive measures.  For example, J.P. 
Morgan observed red flags in late 2006 and “exited the business of 
securitizing subprime mortgages when it was still booming.”
144
  Other 
 
 140 See supra Parts II.A, III.A. 
 141 See Lipshaw, supra note 8, at 21 (“The problem with any reduction to rules . . . 
is the illusion of objectivity, something fostered by the particular construct of con-
cepts that constitutes law generally.”). 
 142 See supra Part III.B. 
 143 See supra Part IV. 
 144 Shawn Tully, Jamie Dimon’s Swat Team: How J.P. Morgan’s CEO and His Crew Are 
Helping the Big Bank Beat the Credit Crunch, CNNMONEY (Sept. 2, 2008, 4:02 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/29/news/companies/tully_dimon.fortune.  J.P. 
Morgan reportedly embraces ERM, focusing on structure and culture.  See Enterprise 
Risk Management, in THE CENTENNIAL GLOBAL BUSINESS SUMMIT REPORT 3–4 (Harvard 
Business School 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/centennial/ 
businesssummit/global-business/enterprise-risk-management.pdf (explaining that, 
at J.P. Morgan, “[r]isk management starts with tone set at the very top” and includes 
“a culture of collaboration”); see also Cinderella’s Moment, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 
2010, available at http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm? 
story_id=15474145 (observing that financial institutions like J.P. Morgan that sur-
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investors actually grossed large profits during 2007 by shorting mort-
gage-backed securities.
145
  But Citigroup remained committed to its 
investment strategy, with little meaningful hedging, until arguably it 
was too late. 
It is difficult to discern with any precision the motivation for Ci-
tigroup’s conduct.  Nevertheless, analyzing its course of action 
through the lens of behavioral economics provides an interesting 
perspective on risk management.
146
  Citigroup, like most financial in-
stitutions, had risk-management procedures in place prior to the 
2008 recession.
147
  Its risk managers and executives had access to in-
 
vived the recession better than their peers “relied largely on giving their risk-
managing roundheads equal status with the risk-taking cavaliers”). 
 145 See, e.g., RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 4 (“Goldman Sachs adjusted its positions 
in mortgage-backed securities beginning in 2006, differentiating itself from the rest 
of the market at a time when some might have criticized the move as excessively cau-
tious.”).  Goldman Sachs’ CFO explained: “In December [2006] our mortgage busi-
ness lost money for 10 days in a row.  It wasn’t a lot of money, but by the 10th day we 
thought that we should sit down and talk about it.”  Nocera, supra note 3, at 1.  This 
recognition reportedly led Goldman Sachs to rein in risk in its subprime mortgage 
portfolio.  Id.; see also Carol Loomis, Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted, 
CNNMONEY (Nov. 28, 2007, 7:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/09/ 
news/newsmakers/merrill_rubin.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2007111119.  Not-
ably, Goldman Sachs has been criticized for, and is the subject of a lawsuit concern-
ing, its products and investment decisions leading up to the 2008 recession.  See John 
D. McKinnon, Senate Probes Bank for Meltdown Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009, at C1, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124890898142691729.html; Press Re-
lease, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud 
in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm. 
 146 See Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics (Nat’l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), available at 
https://www.msu.edu/course/aec/810/clippings/Thaler-behavioral%20 
economics.pdf (“Behavioral economics is the combination of psychology and eco-
nomics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display 
human limitations and complications.”); see also Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of Per-
ceptions, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2006, available at http://harvardmagazine.com/ 
2006/03/the-marketplace-of-perce.html (explaining development of behavioral eco-
nomics); Langevoort, supra note 133 (explaining role of behavioral economics in le-
gal profession).  But see, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring 
Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 141 (2003) (suggesting that behavioral 
economics can help create a more complete picture of the risk management prob-
lem and in turn a more complete solution; it is just one of several analytical tools that 
policymakers can and should utilize in this analyze)(“The broader point is that cog-
nitive biases, though sometimes enlightening, should be used as a last resort rather 
than as a primary or all-purpose explanation for seemingly irrational behavior.”); Ri-
chard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551, 1556-57 (1998) (criticizing behavioral economics).   
 147 See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 39–60 (Feb. 27, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm (describing risk-
management practices). 
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formation that suggested significant potential risk to its major asset 
portfolios.
148
  Yet, Citigroup consistently asserted that its risk exposure 
was nominal.
149
 
The behavioral-economics literature documents unconscious 
cognitive biases that might account for the Citigroup scenario.
150
  
Many commentators have thoughtfully analyzed the impact of indi-
vidual and group biases on decisions by and relations among boards 
of directors and senior management.
151
  This Article considers three 
of those biases in the risk-management context: confirmation bias, 
overconfidence or optimism bias, and framing. 
Confirmation bias commonly is defined as “the tendency to as-
cribe too much weight to evidence that confirms [individuals’ or 
groups’] views and too little weight to evidence that invalidates their 
 
 148 See supra Part IV. 
 149 See, e.g., Joshua Gallu & Donald Griffin, SEC Says Prince, Ruben Knew of Losses on 
Assets at Suit’s Focus, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2010, 11:09 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-09/prince-rubin-knew-assets-at-focus-of-
sec-claim-fueled-losses-agency-says.html (“The New York-based bank’s executives re-
peatedly stated in 2007 that it had reduced exposure to subprime mortgage securities 
by 45 percent to $13 billion, as investors and analysts clamored for information about 
the deteriorating market, according to the agency’s July complaint.”); Jim Zarroli, 
Citigroup CEO Prince Falls to Subprime Debacle, NPR.ORG (Nov. 5, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15995002 (“Prince, 57, was 
insisting jut a few months ago that Citigroup’s subprime exposure was not serious.”). 
 150 See, e.g., Inga Chira et al., Behavioral Bias Within the Decision Making Process, 6 J. 
BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH 11 (2008) (“[Behavioral finance] draws on the psychology 
and cognitive science literatures to examine why individual decision-making often 
deviates from rational choices in systematic ways.”); Tversky and Kahneman, supra 
note 10, at 1124 (“[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations.  In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes 
they lead to severe and systematic errors.”). 
 151 See, e.g., Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509 
(2008); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 323 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of 
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s 
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Psychology of Enron’s Demise]; Lynne L. 
Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 19, 73–77 (1988); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Pow-
er and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Finan-
cial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 
GEO. L.J. 285 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: 
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 797, 812–13 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory 
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 101 (1997); Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 
J. ECON. ISSUES, Sept. 2005, at 613; Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of 
Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237. 
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views.”
152
  Some commentators have identified instances of confirma-
tion bias in corporate boardrooms, including the decision of Sun Mi-
crosystems to continue an aggressive investment strategy in the face 
of an economic downturn.
153
  This hubris encourages individuals on 
an unconscious level to seek out information supporting their posi-
tion and discount opposing views. 
Citigroup’s risk supervisors were operating in an environment 
that fostered confirmation bias.  Reports suggest that Citigroup’s 
trading supervisor, Thomas Maheras, relied on Citigroup’s ratings 
from the ratings agencies to bolster his position that “the bank ‘would 
never lose a penny.’”
154
  Likewise, statements from Chairman Ber-
nanke and others during this period provided support for his posi-
tion.  For example, in May 2007, Chairman Bernanke repeated his 
March statements that “[t]he Federal Reserve does not foresee a 
broader economic impact from the growing number of mortgage de-
faults.”
155
  Moreover, Mr. Prince, colleagues, and subordinates at Citi-
group heavily relied on Mr. Maheras’ projections to continue their 
public statements that the bank was financially sound.
156
 
 
 152 Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 113, 118 
(2001); see also Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12. 
 153 HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE: DECISIONS THAT CREATE 
VALUE 3–10 (2007). 
 154 See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81.  See also Bradley Keoun, Maheras Says Citi-
group Expanded into CDOs at Urging of Bank’s Consultants, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7, 2010, 
1:34 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-07/citigroup-consultants-
urged-cdo-drive-maheras-says.html (“Even in the summer and fall of 2007, I contin-
ued to believe, based upon what I understood from the experts in the business, that 
the bank’s super-senior CDO holdings were safe.”) (quoting Mr. Maheras). 
 155 Jeremy W. Peters, Fed Chief Addresses Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, May. 18, 2007, at 
C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/business/18fed.html; see also 
Economic Committee Timeline, supra note 119, at 22. 
 156 See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81.  A related, but distinct bias, is commitment 
bias.  Irvis L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977).  That hubris makes it difficult to 
change course or exit a failing business strategy.  In Citigroup’s scenario, Mr. Prince 
committed to aggressive growth in Citigroup’s CDO products early in his tenure.  
Dash & Creswell, supra note 81; see also Bradley Keoun, Citi’s Prince Says No One Saw 
CDO Losses Coming, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2010, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-08/prince-rubin-say-they-didn-t-
recognize-citigroup-s-cdo-risk-before-crisis.html (noting Citi’s executives’ CDO 
growth strategy); Matt Pittman, Citigroup’s ‘Last Roman’ CDO Shows Enron Accounting, 
BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2008, 4:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a42143EyVai8 (explaining one of  Citigroup’s CDOs and 
observing that “Citigroup Inc. created a $2.5 billion mortgage-backed security called 
Bonifacius Ltd. in August as capital markets seized up and panic swept Wall Street”); 
Zarroli, supra note 149 (“‘[Citigroup has] been very aggressive and they’ve been 
pushing profit growth very hard in a lot of areas.  And that means that you pile up 
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In addition, Citigroup’s executives’ willingness to buy into rosy 
projections despite the realities surrounding its industry demon-
strates overconfidence and an optimism bias.
157
  Several studies have 
identified overconfidence as a trait affecting corporate CEOs.
158
  Indi-
viduals in these powerful positions tend to overestimate their own ab-
ilities; they often believe that they are the exception to the rule.
159
  
Other financial companies may be affected by the 2008 recession, but 
their company will be the lone standing survivor.  As one commenta-
 
risks that don’t necessarily bother you – unless, all of a sudden, markets chang[ed]’”) 
(quoting Professor Roy Smith).  “From 2003 to 2005, Citigroup more than tripled its 
issuing of [CDOs], to more than $20 billion from $6.28 billion, . . . meaning Citi-
group made up to $500 million in fees from the business in 2005 alone.”  Dash & 
Creswell, supra note 81.  Here, “the subsequent discovery of information that indi-
cates harmful consequences flowing from that commitment directly threatens their 
self-concept as good, worthwhile individuals.  Thus, cognitive processes will work to 
suppress such information if at all possible.”  Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the 
Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 75, 102–03 (1993). 
 157 See, e.g., Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12 (explaining the common biases); 
Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Execu-
tives Decisions, 81 HARV. BUS. R. 56 (2003).  See also Bernardo P. Bressane & Marcelo 
Verdini Maia, CEO Overconfidence & the Impact on M&A Activity (Sept. 1, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1674467 (empirical study suggesting association between CEO overcon-
fidence bias and management decisions in M&A context); Paul Hribar & Holly Yang, 
Does CEO Overconfidence Affect Management Forecasting and Subsequent Earnings Manage-
ment? (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/accounting/docs/Summer_Camp/Hribar.Yang,Does.CEO.
Overconfidence.Affect.Mgmt...pdf (empirical study suggesting “that [CEO] overcon-
fidence increases the optimistic bias in voluntary forecasts, leading to both an in-
creased likelihood of missing management forecasts and greater earnings manage-
ment”). 
 158 Edward Teach, Watch How You Think: Insights from Behavioral Finance Could 
Change the Way Companies Approach Mergers and Acquisitions, CFO MAG., Jan. 2004, 
available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011331/c_3046604 (“Every CEO who 
goes into [an acquisition] thinks he is different–that he will be able to pull it off.”); 
see also Troy A. Parades, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, 
CEOs and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 676 (2005) (“A rich body of 
subsequent empirical research has shown that acquisitions frequently destroy firm 
value when a bidder’s managers overvalue the deal and overestimate their ability to 
execute the deal successfully.”); Ribstein, supra note 28, at 81 (“Executives also are 
susceptible to overconfidence, particularly those who have the highest self-esteem 
and who may also be the most successful.”).  
 159 See, e.g., Hribar & Yang, supra note 157, at 4 (explaining thesis that 
“[o]verconfident managers are more likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts be-
cause they overestimate their ability to affect their financial results and/or underes-
timate the probability of random events” and testing thesis through empirical study); 
see also PAUL C. NUTT, WHY DECISIONS FAIL: AVOIDING THE BLUNDERS AND TRAPS THAT 
LEAD TO DEBACLES (2002) (describing overconfidence and commitment bias present 
in Disney’s decision to open Euro Disney); Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12; Pren-
tice, supra note 24.  
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tor observes, “[M]any companies may unintentionally engage in ex-
cessive optimism, especially when their existence depends on favora-
ble forecasts.”
160
 
Finally, framing can play a significant role in risk-management 
decisions.
161
  “Studies on framing of legal risks find, for example, that 
taxpayers who owe money are more likely to cheat on their taxes than 
taxpayers who expect a refund.”
162
  Although framing arguably in-
fected some of Citigroup’s decisions in 2007, a framing bias likely had 
a much larger impact in creating the situation in which Citigroup 
found itself at that time. 
Consider the following account: 
In 2005, stung by regulatory rebukes and unable to follow Mr. 
Weill’s penchant for expanding Citigroup’s holdings through rap-
id-fire takeovers, Mr. Prince and his board of directors decided to 
push even more aggressively into trading and other businesses 
that would allow Citigroup to continue expanding the bank in-
ternally.
163
 
As Mr. Prince searched for ways to regain Citigroup’s prowess, he and 
his colleagues likely were operating in a loss frame, making them 
more risk seeking.
164
  “This risk taking might be conscious, but deci-
 
 160 Chira et al., supra note 150, at 12. 
 161 Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision 
Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 797 (2003) (“[F]raming bias is the tendency to view a 
given problem in different terms depending on the perspective from which the prob-
lem is viewed.”); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litiga-
tion, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (explaining framing bias); X.T. Wang, Framing Ef-
fects: Dynamics and Task Domains, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION 
PROCESSES, Nov. 1996, at 145 (same). 
 162 Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and 
Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 404 (2004); see also Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regula-
tion in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 779, 784 
(1997) (“But I think that there are enough examples where framing leads investors 
to violate simple economic principles that the SEC and the courts would want to rec-
ognize it.”). 
 163 Dash & Creswell, supra note 81; see also Mara Der Hovanesian et al., Can Chuck 
Prince Clean Up Citi?, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2004, at 32, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_40/b3902049_mz011.htm 
(describing many challenges facing Mr. Prince in turning around Citigroup).  For 
example, one commentator observed, “[Mr. Prince] came in at a time when you 
know a famous leader had been yanked away and there were a lot of problems in the 
past.  All sorts of market disruptions occurred.  And he wasn’t a charismatic leader 
who could rally the troops necessarily.”  Jim Zarroli, supra note 149 (quoting Profes-
sor Roy Smith).  
 164 See, e.g., Painter, supra note 162, at 403 (“Some psychological studies suggest 
that decision makers are risk averse when deciding between two alternatives that they 
perceive to result in a gain, but risk preferring when deciding between two alterna-
tives that they perceive to result in a loss.”); Wang, supra note 161, at 146 (describing 
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sion makers can also conceal risk-preferring behavior from them-
selves by adjusting their estimates of risk artificially downwards.”
165
 
Notably, cognitive biases can overlap and often enable each oth-
er.  For example, the loss framing that might have influenced Mr. 
Prince’s initial decision to invest aggressively in the CDO market like-
ly made him susceptible to confirmation and commitment biases with 
respect to the success of that strategy (as well as his overall strategic 
plan for Citigroup).
166
  Moreover, cognitive biases were not the only 
factors contributing to Citigroup’s scenario.  Citigroup certainly had 
weak controls and risk management, and it admittedly was dealing 
with a very difficult economic environment.
167
 
The presence of cognitive biases in the decision-making process, 
however, cautions against blind reliance on more internal controls 
and risk management as the solution.  As discussed below, the de-
signers of any ERM program should consider cognitive biases.
168
  Re-
flecting on the Citigroup scenario, having more high-level individuals 
responsible for risk assessment and having direct access to individuals 
on the ground gathering the risk-related information might have 
shattered the confirmation bias sooner.  Part of Citigroup’s problem 
 
loss framing in context of Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory and explaining 
that, under this theory).  “[P]eople code the possible choice outcomes as gains and 
losses, and tend to be risk averse when choosing among prospects seen as gains but 
risk seeking when choosing among prospects seen as losses.”  Id.; see also Richard H. 
Thaler et al., The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test, 
Q. J. ECON., May 1997, at 647, 648, available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/ 
fac/Kfir_Eliaz/Thaler1.pdf (explaining myopic loss aversion and noting that 
“[e]mpirical estimates find that losses are weighted about twice as strongly as gains”). 
 165 Painter, supra note 162, at 404. 
 166 Indeed, even after announcing huge losses in October 2007, Mr. Prince con-
tinued to pronounce his confidence in Citigroup and his vision for the firm, stating:  
“No one can be happy with the results in our fixed-income business or with the re-
sults that relate to that.  But, I think if you are able to look at other parts of the busi-
ness, if you look at the strategic plan we’re executing on, I think any fair-minded per-
son would say that strategic plan is working.”  Zarroli, supra note 149. 
 167 See, e.g., Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Feb. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm (“Recent 
market conditions, particularly during the latter part of 2007 and 2008, have involved 
unprecedented dislocations and highlight the limitations inherent in using historical 
data to manage risk.”); Eric Dash, Citigroup Acknowledges Poor Risk Management, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, at C9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/ 
business/16citi.html (“Citigroup acknowledged yesterday that its risk management 
models did not function properly during this summer’s credit crisis, contributing to 
the company’s 57 percent drop in third-quarter profit.”). 
 168 See infra Part V.C. 
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appears to be that most risk information and decisions funneled 
through Mr. Maheras.
169
 
B. Cultural Barriers to Effective ERM 
When Mr. Prince took over as CEO of Citigroup, the firm had a 
reputation for being aggressive and obsessed with maximizing short-
term gains.
170
  At the time, Citigroup was under intense scrutiny for its 
roles in Enron and WorldCom, as well as questionable trading prac-
tices in Japan and Europe.  Mr. Prince vowed to change corporate 
culture but ultimately remained aggressive in his pursuit of profits, 
creating a culture where “senior managers got addicted to the reve-
nues and arrogant about the risks they were running.”
171
 
Citigroup is not alone in promoting an aggressive, win-at-all-cost 
corporate culture.  That culture arguably is the norm in the United 
States.
172
  The 2008 recession has called into question the utility of 
that culture, and many policymakers and commentators, including 
ERM proponents, are pushing for an overhaul of corporate culture.
173
  
But change is hard and slow, and memories of tragic events like the 
 
 169 See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81. 
 170 See, e.g., Louise Cooper, Scandal-hit Citigroup Rebuilds Its Image, BBC NEWS (Mar. 
14, 2005, 3:26 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4318333.stm. 
 171 See Dash & Creswell, supra note 81; Zarroli, supra note 149 (noting that Citi-
group under Mr. Prince has “been very aggressive and . . . pushing profit growth very 
hard in a lot of areas”). 
 172 See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera et al., Damning Insight into Corporate Culture Sheds 
Light on Fall of a Wall Street Giant, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0441982-2e40-11df-85c0-00144feabdc0.html (noting 
that the examiner report on Lehman Brothers describes the firm as an “organisation 
prepared to take short cuts and huge risks to boost earnings, where control and ac-
counting procedures were found to be sorely lacking”); Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 
supra note 151, at 54 (“Enron has been described as having an arrogant climate. 
Such a climate is prone to greater homogeneity because differing views are not va-
lued.  This homogeneity can result in exaggerating the impact of various decision-
making biases.”).  Cynthia Webster & Allyn White, Exploring the National and Organiza-
tional Culture Mix in Service Firms, J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. (2009) (describing a study 
analyzing corporate cultures in United States and Japan and observing that the “U.S. 
is characterized by such values as assertiveness, decisiveness, innovativeness . . . and 
risk-taking, which stem from its frontier-conquering history.”).  Interestingly, J.P. 
Morgan’s corporate culture has been described as “‘extremely cautious, ultra-
conservative,’ and bureaucratic.”  Liz Wolgemuth, JPMorgan and Bear Stearns: A Cul-
ture Challenge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/ 
money/careers/articles/2008/03/31/jpmorgan-and-bear-stearns-a-culture-
challenge.html.  This difference may reflect J.P. Morgan’s earlier embrace of general 
ERM principles.  See supra note 144. 
 173 See supra Parts II.A, III.A. 
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2008 recession are short.  Moreover, pressure in the boardroom to 
increase the bottom line remains. 
Notably, studies suggest a strong link between corporate culture 
and risk-management practices.
174
  For example, one study of firms in 
thirty-five different countries shows a strong, negative association be-
tween harmonious corporate cultures and risk taking and a strong, 
positive association between individual-centric corporate cultures and 
risk taking.
175
  The study defines “harmony” in the context of cultures 
that are “more accepting of traditional ways of doing business rather 
than striving for innovation.”
176
  It defines “individualism” in the con-
text of cultures that “focus on individual freedom and personal chal-
lenge.”
177
  Perhaps not surprisingly, the United States scored the 
highest on cultures exhibiting individual-centric characteristics.
178
 
Although this study focuses on corporate culture in relation to 
country of origin, its data provide helpful insight into the values that 
enhance or detract from cultivating a risk culture.
179
  As demonstrated 
by the Citigroup scenario, a win-at-all-costs culture may impede a firm 
embracing ERM beyond a pure process approach.  ERM proponents 
recognize this limitation, which drives in part their strong emphasis 
on corporate culture.
180
  “Enterprise risk management—to be effec-
tive—must fundamentally change the way organizations think about 
risk.”
181
  Accordingly, in addition to mechanisms to mitigate cognitive 
biases, policymakers and ERM proponents must create incentives for 
U.S. boards and management to buy into a risk culture. 
C. Strengthening ERM Proposals 
More people knowing more information and accepting respon-
sibility for risk decisions is a good first step in addressing risk-
management failures.  ERM provides a useful framework to achieve 
those objectives.  But a firm adopting ERM or even just more rigor-
ous risk-management procedures will not necessarily improve risk-
 
 174 See Dale Griffin et al., Cultural Values and Corporate Risk Taking 1–4 (March 
17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362163 (describing prior studies on culture and risk tak-
ing). 
 175 Id. at 7, 28–29. 
 176 Id. at 7. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 13. 
 179 Id. at 17–23. 
 180 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 5–7, 8 (Apr. 27, 2010). 
 181 RIMS PAPER, supra note 3, at 9. 
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management decisions.
182
  Risk-related regulations and best practices 
need to account for cognitive biases and the challenges in creating 
true risk cultures, and whether through regulation or the markets, 
firms need incentives to commit the time and resources necessary to 
develop effective ERM. 
1. Breaking down the Behavioral Barrier 
Overcoming cognitive bias is a tricky endeavor.  One popular 
approach is training to sensitize individuals to their potential biases.  
This technique is used in a variety of settings, including discrimina-
tion in the workplace and strategic decisions in the courtroom.
183
  
Studies are split regarding the utility of training, and some commen-
tators observe the risk of the training itself being biased or creating 
new biases.
184
  Nevertheless, as boards and management consider 
ERM and reflect on risk-related decisions, training regarding deci-
sion-making skills, including the impact of cognitive biases, may 
complement the process with nominal downside risk.
185
 
 
 182 See supra Part V.A. 
 183 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound 
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20–29 (2001); Alafair Burke, 
Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 
(2007) (discussing debiasing training in prosecutor/litigation context); Tristin K. 
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate 
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).   
 184 See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 183, at 29–30 (describing uncertainty regarding 
success of bias training and noting dearth of empirical support for approach); Ka-
therine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be Improved? 379–80 (Persp. on 
Psychol. Sci., Working Paper No. 08-102, 2008) (noting that studies show that train-
ing produces only minimal success); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sustein, Debias-
ing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 229 (2006) (“But in some circumstances, a 
strategy of debiasing through law could introduce new distortions through its effect 
on those who did not previously exhibit bounded rationality.”); Lipshaw, supra note 
8, at 21 (“But the recursiveness of self-analysis is problematic in the internal making, 
as opposed to the analysis, of judgments; one may attempt to assess the extent of 
one’s own bias, framing issues, heuristics, and so, but the analysis itself may be sub-
ject to those same influences.”).  
 185 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 788–92 (2002) (suggesting training to combat investor 
biases); Jolls & Sustein, supra note 184, at 234 (“[D]ebiasing through law—especially 
debiasing through substantive law—is a distinctive and sometimes far preferable al-
ternative to the strategy of insulating legal outcomes from the effects of bounded ra-
tionality.”); see also Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination 
Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 860 (2007) (suggesting that 
training, in connection with structural changes, may address biases more effectively 
at least in workplace discrimination context). 
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This is not to say that boards will automatically make better or 
unbiased decisions; they might not.  The training, however, would in-
crease the prospect of boards and management at least hesitating and 
reflecting on a decision before pulling the trigger.
186
  That reflection 
time could result in some better outcomes.  Many firms have incor-
porated ongoing training for their boards.
187
  Extending that training 
to management to cover cognitive biases likely can be done at little 
cost and with significant potential return. 
In addition to training, boards and management could create 
objective tools to gauge biases.  For example, in setting the firm’s risk 
appetite, the board and management could breakout in detail the 
firm’s acceptable risk exposure overall and in different segments or 
projects and then adopt rigorous approval procedures for changing 
or making exceptions to those designations.
188
  By setting parameters 
at the outset—before any surprises or exigencies—boards and man-
agement would have an objective measure for their subsequent deci-
sions.  The change/exception approval process again would mandate 
a moment of hesitation and give decision makers the opportunity to 
recognize any bias.  They may still miss the opportunity, but it gives 
the individuals involved in the process yet another chance to get it 
right. 
Another technique would be employing an outside consultant to 
model potential risks and to role-play with the board and manage-
ment.
189
  Here, the consultant basically would play devil’s advocate, 
 
 186 See, e.g., Green, supra note 184, at 858–60; Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, 
Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Eval-
uations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 130–35 (1994) (explaining ways to improve out-
comes of bias training by emphasizing awareness of, motivation for and conse-
quences/direction of bias). 
 187 See, e.g., Enterprise Risk Management Initiative: Enterprise Risk Management Executive 
Education, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.mgt.ncsu.edu/erm/index.php/about/executive-training (explaining 
targeted ERM training programs for boards and board committees). 
 188 See supra Part II.B (discussing mapping and profiling aspects of ERM). 
 189 An outside consultant could serve in various capacities.  For example, studies 
regarding the impact of training show a greater success rate with hands-on personal 
coaching for the decision maker.  See Katherine L. Milkman et al., supra note 184, at 
382.  Alternatively, the consultant could serve as a “choice architect,” who “design[s] 
situations in which choices are made . . . to maximize the odds that decision makers 
will make wise choices.”  Id. at 386–87 (citing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. 
Press) (2008)).  A similar proposal is being encouraged in Australia.  See Leon Gett-
ler, Reversing Risks, IN THE BLACK, Nov. 2009, at 39, available at 
http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/newsletters/36-39_Reversing_%20Risks.pdf (“A real 
opportunity lies in developing roles in companies with risk expertise, for experts who 
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identifying remote or seemingly inconsequential risks and countering 
the board’s and management’s responses with opposing perspec-
tives.
190
  In Citigroup’s scenario, a consultant could have asked the 
hard questions like why are Citigroup’s holdings safe while others in 
the industry are exposed.  If Citigroup had responded that it was rely-
ing on its ratings from outside agencies, the consultant could have 
asked why an outsider’s assessment of the firm’s risk should trump an 
internal assessment and point out that outside perspectives typically 
are based on information provided by the firm. 
It is of course easy to script this conversation with the benefit of 
hindsight and much more difficult to do it in the moment.
191
  The 
purpose of the consultant would not necessarily be to identify what 
the board and management missed.  Rather, a primary objective 
would be to facilitate or teach the board and management how to fa-
cilitate conversations leading to that information.
192
  In that regard, 
the consultant technique could be a once-a-year training program or 
a resource tapped into in times of uncertainty. 
2. Breaking down Cultural Barriers 
As articulated in the ERM literature, the board and senior man-
agement must implement and maintain the creation of a risk cul-
ture.
193
  ERM training again may help boards and management ap-
preciate exactly what it means to have a risk culture and the value of 
that culture.  The training, however, will not create a risk culture; a 
risk culture will be the product of board and management initiative.
194
 
Why would a board agree to create a risk culture?  The board 
has a duty to maximize shareholder wealth, and many firms abide by 
 
can go in and model scenarios for managers to get a much deeper understanding of 
their risk profile.”).   
 190 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 183, at 523–28 (discussing potential value of having 
internal and external checks on decision making, including checks that challenge 
thinking or assumptions of decision maker); Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case 
for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, Mar. 22, 2010, at 8, available at 
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/PDFDownload.aspx?ar=2551&srid=7&gp=1 
(urging internal and external review of risk options and noting that “[s]ometimes, 
simply coaxing managers to articulate the experiences influencing them is valua-
ble”).  The President & CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has suggested an 
outside review by regulatory supervisors that could ask firms questions regarding risk 
exposures, including those viewed as nominal by the particular firm, and then “could 
evaluate the impact and perhaps conclude that the chance of a cascading systemic 
financial crisis was too big of a chance to take.”  Rosengren, supra note 81. 
 191 See supra note 133. 
 192 See Lovallo & Sibony, supra note 190. 
 193 See supra note 38.  
 194 See supra Parts II.A, III.A. 
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a high-risk, high-reward strategy.  And is not failure just a risk of 
doing business? 
Those are difficult questions, and the answer may not be the 
same for every firm.  Boards, management, and stakeholders looking 
to avoid the extraordinary and unexpected losses experienced in re-
cent corporate scandals and the 2008 recession might find the en-
deavor worthwhile.  As noted above, more data showing the value of 
ERM may help convince these firms to adopt the procedures volunta-
rily (or involuntarily under stakeholder pressure).
195
  Alternatively, 
policymakers could mandate compliance.
196
  In either event, training 
and motivation will be crucial to ERM’s success. 
3. Regulating ERM 
As business techniques, ERM and the approaches for addressing 
bias and creating a risk culture sound great, but do they raise legal 
issues or require legal intervention?  ERM directly impacts corporate 
governance.  To the extent that the law evaluates and governs the re-
lationship between the board, management, and shareholders, ERM 
invokes legal consideration.  Nevertheless, this Article does not sug-
gest that the law should mandate ERM for every corporation in every 
context.
197
 
Rather, ERM appears better suited as a best practice for corpo-
rate governance that would offer firms legal protection against cer-
tain liabilities.  The framework for this approach largely exists in the 
 
 195 See supra notes 52–55. 
 196 See, e.g., Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 92, at 47–52, 54 (proposing a though-
tful approach to mandating more thorough risk management procedures through 
regulation that focuses on, among other things, deliberation, contemporaneous ra-
tionale and regulator oversight).  
 197 Imposing a mandatory risk management scheme on all public corporations 
likely would increase resistance to implementing meaningful ERM programs and en-
courage thoughtless compliance with the stated process.  See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Game Theory, Insurance and Kant: Toward a Moral Theory of 
Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083, 1088 (2004) (examining the shortcomings 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and similar legislation and observing that “[f]rom the po-
sitivist point of view, Sarbanes-Oxley is a rule that imposes an obligation on corporate 
directors not to repeat the sins of the Enron and WorldCom debacles. And public 
companies have duly obeyed, like drivers at stop signs in empty intersections at three 
a.m., often out of compliance for compliance sake, and not for salutary benefit that 
should result from compliance”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (assessing the utility 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act based on the information and process underlying the leg-
islation).  The complexity of business-risk decisions and the variance based on a 
number of critical factors, including industry and size counsel in favor of encourag-
ing ERM through best practices and incentives.  
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regulations adopted after the corporate scandals in the early 2000s.
198
  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the NYSE listing requirements already 
require corporations to consider risk and adopt codes of ethics, and 
the listing requirements also require board training.
199
  A firm could 
easily expand a code of ethics to cover its risk-management policy, 
and it could likewise expand training in scope and attendance.
200
  
Moreover, firms could opt out of these requirements by disclosing 
their decision to do so, recognizing that they lose any protections or 
defenses available to firms following the guidelines.
201
 
As to those protections and defenses, the Sentencing Guidelines 
could provide reduced penalties for firms establishing an ERM pro-
gram that complies with best practices.
202
  The SEC could grant addi-
tional weight to ERM programs in considering whether to file en-
forcement actions, and courts could use ERM best practices as 
evidence refuting knowledge in securities cases and proving good 
faith where boards are alleged to have failed to act in the face of a 
known duty or risk.
203
  Even in the context of duty-to-monitor claims, 
ERM could expedite or streamline the litigation, particularly if self-
regulatory organizations or similar institutions emerge to review and 
certify ERM programs.
204
 
 
 198 See supra notes 27–31. 
 199 See supra Part III.A.  As discussed above, many commentators criticize the one-
size-fits-all nature of many aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as certain of its 
other features.  Id.  The proposals discussed in this Article try to avoid many of those 
pitfalls.  
 200 See, e.g., Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 151, at 55–58 (suggesting use of 
a code of ethics and training to create a more ethical corporate culture).  Notably, 
many firms have both a code of ethics and a code of conduct.  A firm’s code of con-
duct also might be an appropriate place to discuss risk policies either in addition to 
or in lieu of discussing it in the code of ethics.   
 201 See, e.g., supra Part II.A (discussing the “disclose or explain” nature of the ethics 
code requirements under the Sarbanes Oxley Act); see also Luca Enriques & Paolo 
Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PRINCIPLES 117, 
134–36 (2007) (describing process whereby German firms may opt out of certain go-
vernance requirements upon a vote of shareholders representing at least 75% of the 
shares). 
 202 See supra Parts II.A, III.A; see also Hess, supra note 31, at 1806–16 (discussing 
challenges and benefits of trying to encourage ethical corporate cultures under the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines). 
 203 See supra Part III.B.2; see also Harner, supra note 3, at 55–56. 
 204 “Self-regulation is a broad concept that includes any attempt by an industry to 
moderate its conduct with the intent of improving marketplace behavior for the ul-
timate benefit of consumers. The universe of self-regulatory organizations includes 
industry-wide or economy-wide private groups that provide, inter alia, certification, 
product information, complaint resolution, quality assurance, industrial standards, 
product compatibility standards, professional conduct standards, and complaint reso-
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In determining what constitutes best practices and whether to 
acknowledge a process as effective ERM, policymakers and industry 
players need to consider the potential barriers to effective ERM, in-
cluding those discussed in this Article.
205
  Accordingly, best practices 
should include training on cognitive biases, require objective risk set-
ting and risk-modification standards, and recommend outside consul-
tants.  They also should emphasize the board’s role in creating a risk 
culture and require boards to demonstrate their commitment to that 
culture through the firm’s code of ethics, dissemination of risk in-
formation, and participation in the process.  Using a best-practices 
approach allows firms to tailor ERM programs to their specific needs 
or adapt those programs to internal or external changes. 
In addition to regulatory incentives to adopt ERM, the markets 
could be very influential in ERM’s meaningful development.
206
  As 
stakeholders realize the value of ERM, shareholders can request that 
firms adopt ERM either informally or through shareholder proposals, 
and lenders can address ERM disclosures in their transaction docu-
ments.  Likewise, as investors become more knowledgeable about 
ERM, they may make investment decisions based on firms with certi-
fied or well-documented ERM programs.  As discussed above, Stan-
dard & Poor’s is already working to provide investors with this type of 
information.
207
 
Just as risk management did not cause the 2008 recession, im-
proving risk-management practices through ERM or otherwise will 
not prevent the next one.  Nevertheless, thoughtful and considered 
risk planning may mitigate the losses suffered by firms in the next 
economic downturn and generally constitutes good business.  To the 
extent that such practices preserve firm value and thereby protect 
 
lution.”  Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address before the 
Council of Better Business Bureaus: Self Regulatory Organizations and the FTC (Apr. 
11, 2005); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008) (explain-
ing use and potential issues relating to SROs); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with 
Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
975, 1022–26 (2005) (reviewing traditional use of SROs in securities industry).  
 205 See supra Parts V.A, V.B. 
 206 See Harner, supra note 3, at 52–53; see also INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE NETWORK, supra note 180 (encouraging institutional investors to take an 
active role in reviewing and assessing a firm’s risk management practices, explaining 
“[t]he objective of these principles is to help investors assess how well a portfolio 
company’s board—either unitary or supervisory—is effectively overseeing risk man-
agement.”).  
 207 See supra Part III.A. 
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stakeholders’ interests, policymakers and markets should provide ap-
propriate incentives for firms to adopt meaningful ERM. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As some commentators have observed, the 2008 recession was a 
“wake-up call” for risk management.
208
  Many firms not only were sur-
prised by developments during the recession but also had no effective 
means to communicate or respond to the changing financial land-
scape.  The subprime-mortgage crisis and subsequent events para-
lyzed their operations.  Better risk-management practices would not 
have averted the 2008 recession, but they might have shortened the 
duration and eased the severity of the financial turmoil. 
As policymakers and firms reflect on the recession, they should 
consider how risk-management improvements can help firms operate 
more efficiently and be better prepared for the next round of opera-
tional or economic surprises.  Here, ERM offers a technique for firm-
wide risk identification, assessment, and response that involves the 
board of directors, senior management, and appropriate individuals 
throughout the firm.
209
  Like any risk-management practice, however, 
ERM has its limitations and is not a cure for all corporate ills. 
Policymakers and industry organizations promulgating best 
practices should recognize the behavioral and cultural barriers to ef-
fective risk management and encourage processes that account for 
those limitations.  Among other things, guidelines suggesting ERM 
and cognitive-bias training and the integration of risk practices into 
codes of ethics might assist firms in developing meaningful risk as-
sessment and not simply more risk-related process.
210
  The goal of any 
risk-related policy should be helping firms make better-informed de-
cisions—both as to the substance of the problem and the means for 
reaching the decision itself.  As Warren Buffet has observed, “Risk 
comes from not knowing what you’re doing.”
211
 
 
 
 208 See id. 
 209 See supra Parts II.A, III.A. 
 210 See supra Part V.C. 
 211 Brad Tuttle, Warren Buffet’s Boring, Brilliant Wisdom, IT’S YOUR MONEY (Mar. 1, 
2010, 9:06 AM), available at http://money.blogs.time.com/2010/03/01/warren-
buffetts-boring-brilliant-wisdom. 
